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USING DEVICE MOVEMENT FOR MULTI-FACTOR  
COMPUTING DEVICE AUTHENTICATION 
 
 
 
 Multi-factor computing device authentication involves a user providing information in 
addition to their username and password in order to access a service.  Common examples today 
include entering a temporary PIN code, answering a personal question, or touching a security key 
that is installed locally on a computing device.  The technology described in this document 
enables a user to physically move their computing device in a particular pattern to verify their 
presence, as part of a secure multi-factor computing device authentication process. 
 
 KEY GENERATION 
 To implement such a technology, a Movement Service could be developed and loaded 
into local memory on a mobile computing device.  The Movement Service may be part of the 
operating system of the computing device, and may encode movement into an encrypted 
movement key.  The encrypted movement key may be a hash of various signals that the 
computing device captures while the user is moving the computing device in a particular pattern 
during an authentication process.  The various signals that form the basis for an encrypted 
movement key may include (i) duration of the movement, (ii) speed of the movement, (iii) 
acceleration during the movement, (iv) orientation of the computing device during the 
movement, (v) pressure of user fingers on the computing device during the movement, (vi) 
proximity of the computing device to the user during the movement, (vii) device connectivity 
characteristics such as WIFI and data connection, and (viii) device characteristics, such as phone 
model and operating system version. 
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 FIRST IMPLEMENTATION 
 A user may be prompted during enrollment for a multi-factor authentication process to 
imagine a particular movement/gesture that is secret to the user, and then to move their mobile 
computing device in the intended manner responsive to a computing device prompt.  The mobile 
computing device may record any combination of the above described sensor signals and device 
characteristics (and potentially other sensor signals and device characteristics) during the 
movement, and the mobile computing device can store those characteristics as an encrypted 
movement key on the computing device. 
 Upon the user attempting to access a service that requires multi-factor computing device 
authentication, such a service can request that the user verify their authenticity by reproducing 
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the movement that the user provided during the enrollment process.  In response, the user can 
move the computing device in the same manner that the user performed during the enrollment 
process, in order to verify that the individual attempting to access the service is the actual user 
and not an unauthorized individual.  This movement will be referenced in this document as an 
authentication gesture, and can include a single movement or multiple different types of 
movements over a period of time.  The Movement Service on the phone may encode movements 
recorded by the sensors of the computing device after the user is prompted to provide an 
authentication gesture, and the computing device can compare those encoded movements to the 
stored encrypted movement key that was generated during enrollment.  If the data generated 
during entry of the authentication gesture matches the encrypted movement key, the computing 
device can provide a “PASS” signal to the requesting service by way of the Movement Service.  
If the encoded movements do not match the encrypted movement key, the user may be prompted 
to provide the authentication gesture another time.  After some N amount of failed attempts to 
provide a valid authentication gesture, the Movement Service may send a “FAIL” signal back to 
the requesting service. 
 
 SECOND IMPLEMENTATION 
 A second implementation allows for non-permanent movement verification to be 
specified by the requesting service.  For example, a user may attempt to log into their bank’s web 
service.  The bank’s web service could verify the authenticity of the user with a multi-factor 
computing device authentication process that relies on user entry of an authentication gesture 
similar to that provided above.  But, instead of the user having to perform an authentication 
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gesture that the user previously specified during an enrollment process, the bank web service 
could specify the authentication gesture for the user to perform. 
 As an example, a user may visit a web service for the bank and enter his username and 
password into the appropriate fields.  After doing so, the bank web service may ask the user to 
perform the following sequence of movements: (1) Flip the phone upside down for 1 second, (2) 
Shake the phone gently for 3 seconds, and (3) Rotate the phone right side up.  The Movement 
Service on the mobile computing device may encode signals generated by sensors on the 
computing device during entry of the authentication gesture in the manner described above with 
a hash value that forms the encrypted movement key.  The Movement Service may then compare 
the encrypted movement key against a library of movement keys that represent different types of 
authentication gestures.  A result of the comparison process may be passed back to the bank’s 
web service.  For example, the computing device may indicate whether the user-entered 
authentication gesture matches the authentication gesture specified by the web service, by 
providing either a “PASS” or “FAIL” signal to the bank web service. 
 
 THIRD IMPLEMENTATION 
 A third implementation enables users to encode multiple authentication gestures during 
enrollment.  In this implementation, the user may perform multiple iterations of the enrollment 
process and may specify a different authentication gesture during each iteration, with the 
Movement Process generating a different encrypted movement key during each iteration.  A 
service may specify the type of authentication gesture that the user has to perform to access the 
service, or may simply request that the user perform any authentication gestures that the user 
specified during enrollment.  For example, the Movement Service can select an authentication 
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gesture randomly from the multiple authentication gestures that the user previously specified, or 
the Movement Service can select the authentication gesture that the user must perform based on 
a context of the computing device (e.g., a location of the computing device or a time of the day). 
 As an example, a user may attempt to log into his bank’s web service.  The web service 
may decide to verify that the user is who he says that he is using a multi-factor computing device 
authentication process that requires user entry of an authentication gesture, and can relay a 
request to the Movement Service to perform the authentication process.  The Movement Service 
may analyze a context of the computing device, recognize that the device is on a WIFI network 
that corresponds to a home of the user, and therefore may prompt the user to provide a “Lite” 
authentication gesture.  During a previous enrollment process, the user may have been prompted 
to perform a “Lite” authentication gesture and may have performed a simple shake of the phone 
for 2 seconds.  As such, the user may simply shake the phone for 2 seconds, the Movement 
Service may determine that this movement matches the “Lite” authentication gesture that the 
user previously entered, and the Movement Service may send a PASS signal to the bank web 
service. 
 The user may later attempt to log into the same bank web service, but this time from a 
friend’s house.  The Movement Service may recognize that the device is on an unfamiliar WIFI 
network and therefore may prompt the user to perform a “Complex” movement that the user 
previously specified during an enrollment process.  The “Complex” movement may involve 
more motions and/or a longer duration of each movement. 
An advantage of allowing users to enter multiple verification movements is that a 
computing device can prompt a user to provide contextually-relevant authentication gestures 
depending on the situation.  Users may not be annoyed with entering complex authentication 
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gestures when accessing a service in environments that pose less threat of attack by a malicious 
entity, but may have the additional security and peace of mind that comes with having to provide 
a complex movement sequence when in an environment that poses a greater threat of attack by a 
malicious entity. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 An interesting aspect of this technology is that authentication can require physical control 
of the computing device.  It would be difficult for a malicious individual to hack a series of 
movements, given the significant number of data points that are collected by device sensors 
during user entry of a verification gesture.  Consider, for example, an authentication gesture that 
lasts 5 seconds and involves 4 different position changes.  The number of data points collected 
by the Movement Service during the authentication movement would be based on the number of 
sensors that capture the movement, multiplied by a rate at which the Movement Service is 
capturing data.  The number of data points could be in the hundreds of thousands, rendering 
brute-force attacks difficult.   
 A comparable example in the offline world would be attempting to forge a handwritten 
signature, but being required to do so at the same speed at which the signature was originally 
written, using the same pen pressure and stroke, and using the same pen angles and orientation of 
the pen with respect to the user.  An advantage of having physical control over the device into 
which an authentication gesture must be specified is that a hack or leak of movement data could 
be remedied fairly easily by a user simply creating a new authentication gesture.  In contrast, a 
data leak that exposes answers to personal history questions can compromise such information 
forever. 
7
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 1862 [2019]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1862
 Another advantage of having physical movement encoded and hashed locally on a mobile 
computing device is that it avoids an attack vector in which a malicious entity attempts to 
intercept a PIN code that is emailed or texted to a mobile number.  Another advantage of the 
approaches described in this document is that they can provide reduced latency for a user, which 
provides a faster and more streamlined approach to multi-factor authentication.  For example, 
consider the time difference between a user waiting for a PIN to be emailed or texted to the user 
and then manually entered into the service application, in distinction to a user being able to 
immediately move their device in a specific pattern. 
 Further to the descriptions above, a user may be provided with controls allowing the user 
to make an election as to both if and when a computing device would record movement of the 
computing device.  For example, a user may need to enroll in a movement verification process 
before any service is able to ask the user to perform an authentication gesture as its form of 
multi-factor device authentication.  A computing device may not analyze movement of a 
computing device during an authentication process unless a user has previously requested that an 
authentication gesture be an option for multi-factor authentication. 
 As described above, the movement data and various other signals may be stored on the 
computing device as a hash value, such that the original movement data cannot be recovered 
from the hash, and movement and context that relate to the authentication gesture cannot be 
deciphered even were the hash value to be accessed.  In summary, the system may be designed 
so that the user has control over what information is collected about the user, how that 
information is used, and what information is provided to the user. 
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 ABSTRACT 
 A mobile computing device such as a smartphone may allow a user to confirm their 
identity during an authentication process by moving their phone according to a specified 
authentication gesture.  The authentication gesture may be one that the user previously specified 
during an enrollment process and may otherwise be secret (e.g., the computing device may 
prompt the user to “Move the phone according to your secret authentication gesture”).  In 
another example, the computing device may specify a type of authentication gesture for the user 
to perform (e.g., the computing device may prompt the user to “Move the phone in a star 
shape”).  A user may provide an authentication gesture in addition to a username and a password 
in a multi-factor authentication scheme. 
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